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Abstract: While the website administrators cannot blacklist individual Internet protocol address of 
malicious users, they blacklist complete anonymizing system. On the other hand these measures reduce 
malicious activity through anonymizing networks at the expense of disallowing anonymous access 
towards behaving users. In our work we provide widespread credential system known as Nymble which is 
an effective system. It can be used to include a layer of accountability towards any publicly accepted 
anonymizing network. Here the servers overcome a potential to blacklist misbehaving users, as a result 
blocking users without compromising their anonymity. The proposed system makes usage of secured 
cryptographic hash functions, secured digital signatures, and secured symmetric-key encryption as well 
as data structures for maintaining efficiency. Our work will enhance the majority approval of 
anonymizing networks, which has, so far, been totally blocked by quite a lot of services because of users 
who misuse their anonymity. Our system verifies that users are responsive of their blacklist position 
before they present a nymble, and disconnect instantly if they are blacklisted. 
Keywords: Internet protocol, Nymble, Anonymity, Malicious users, Blacklisting, Data structures, 
Cryptographic functions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Anonymizing networks such as Tor route traffic 
through independent nodes in separate 
administrative domains to hide a client’s IP 
address. However, some users have misused such 
networks under the cover of anonymity; users have 
repeatedly defaced popular websites. Since website 
administrators cannot blacklist individual malicious 
users’ IP addresses, they blacklist the entire 
anonymizing network. Such measures eliminate 
malicious activity through anonymizing networks 
at the cost of denying anonymous access to 
behaving users. In other words, a few “bad apples”  
spoil the fun for all. (This has happened repeatedly 
with Tor.1).In the literature there are large number 
of solutions to this problem, each providing 
accountability some extent. 
 In the systems of pseudonymous credential user’s 
sign into websites by means of pseudonyms, those 
are added to a blacklist during misbehaviour of a 
user [2]. However this method results in 
pseudonymity for the entire users and weakens the 
anonymity. These schemes suffer from a common 
weakness that there is little to motivate or prevent a 
user from sharing his pseudonyms or credentials 
with other users. 
In Group Signatures [3] servers allow to revoke or 
cancel a misbehaving user’s anonymity by 
complaining it to a group manager. But the servers 
must have to query the group manager for each and 
every authentication and hence this system 
considerably lacks scalability. There is a constraint 
that servers can easily find users’ IP addresses with 
the use of Traceable Signature. 
Traceable Signatures [4] allow the group manager 
to release a trapdoor that allows all signatures 
generated by a particular user to be traced; such an 
approach does not provide the backward 
unlinkability. 
Backward unlinkability allows subjective 
blacklisting. Subjective blacklisting is suitable to 
the servers like Wikipedia where misbehaviours 
like questionable edits to a Webpage are difficult to 
define in mathematical terms. With dynamic 
accumulators [5], a revocation operation results in a 
new accumulator and public parameters for the 
group, and all other existing users’ credentials must 
be updated, and it is thus difficult to manage in 
practical settings. 
Verifier-local revocation (VLR) [6] fixes this 
shortcoming by requiring the server to perform 
only local updates during revocation. 
Unfortunately, VLR requires heavy computation at 
the server that is linear in the size of the blacklist. It 
is time consuming and is less secure. 
In our work we present an efficient system of 
Nymble, users acquire an ordered collection of 
nymbles to connect to websites without additional 
information and using these collections of nymbles 
anonymous access to services. Servers can blacklist 
users by obtaining a seed for a particular nymble, 
allowing them to link future nymbles from the 
same user. Therefore Servers can therefore 
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blacklist anonymous users without the knowledge 
of their IP. 
Our system ensures that users are aware of their 
blacklist status before they present a nymble, and 
disconnect immediately if they are blacklisted. 
Although our work applies to anonymizing 
networks in general, we consider Tor for the 
purpose of exposition. In our system any number of 
anonymizing networks can rely on the same 
Nymble system. The System uses the Secure 
cryptographic hash functions, secure message 
authentication, secure symmetric-key encryption, 
secure digital signatures and data structures for 
efficiency. 
 
Figure1: Overview of Nymble System. 
OVERIEW PROPOSED SYSTEM 
The PM knowledge about Tor Routers and users 
are directly communicating with it as shown in 
Figure1.Then PM issues pseudonyms to users. A 
pseudonym pse has two components ny and ma: ny 
is a pseudo-random mapping of the user’s identity 
(e.g. IP address), the linkability window w for 
which the pseudonym is valid, and the PM’s secret 
key PKeyp; ma is a MC that the NM uses to verify 
the integrity of the pseudonym. This is described in 
Algorithm. 
Algorithm : Pseudonym 
    Input: (uid, w) ∈H×M  
    Output: pnym ∈P  
1: Extract PKeyP , NKeyNP from pmState  
2: ny := MC(uid||w, PKeyP )  
3: ma := MC(nym||w, macKeyNP)  
4: return pse := (ny, ma)  
 
After obtaining a pseudonym from the PM, the user 
connects NM through the Tor network, and 
requests nymbles for access to a particular server. 
A user’s requests to the NM and then nymbles are 
generated using the user’s pseudonym and the 
server’s identity. These nymbles are thus speciﬁc to 
a particular user-server pair.  
The Nymble tickets are bound to speciﬁc time 
periods and the time is divided into linkability 
windows of duration W’, each of which is split into 
L time periods of duration T (i.e., W’ = L*T ). The 
time periods and linkability windows 
chronologically are t1,t2…tk and w1 ,w2 
,..respectively.  
The user connects and misbehaves at a server 
during time period t’ within linkability window w’. 
The server detects this misbehavior and complains 
to the NM in time period tt of the same linkability 
window w’. As part of the complaint, the server 
presents the nymble ticket of the misbehaving user 
and obtains the corresponding seed from the NM.  
 
Figure. 2. The life cycle of a misbehaving user 
Our system makes sure that users are conscious of 
their blacklist position before they provide a 
nymble, and cut off instantly if they are blacklisted. 
In our proposed system users acquire an efficient 
collection of nymbles, a particular type of 
pseudonym, to connect the websites. The system 
uses Building Blocks and Data Structures for its 
functioning. 
MAJOR BUILDING BLOCKS AND DATA 
STRUCTURES 
The system makes use of building blocks such as: 
Secure cryptographic hash functions which are 
functions of one-way and collision-resistant that 
resemble unsystematic oracles and denoted by H. 
Secure message authentication consist of key 
generation and message authentication code MC 
computation and denoted by M.  
Secure symmetric-key encryption consist of key 
generation, encryption as well as decryption. 
Secure digital signatures consist of key generation 
signing as well as verification.  
The system uses the data structures for the 
evaluation of seeds and nymbles. A nymble is a 
pseudo-random number, which serves as an 
identiﬁer for a particular time period. The seeds 
evolve throughout a linkability window using a 
seed-evolution function f; the seed for the next time 
period (snext) is computed from the seed for the 
current time period (scur) as snext = f(scur).The 
nymble   (nt ) for a time period t is evaluated by 
applying the nymble-evaluation function g to its 
corresponding seed (st), i.e.,             (nt )=g(st). 
The NM sets s0 to a pseudo-random mapping of the 
user’s pseudonym pnym, the identity of the server 
sid, the linkability window w for which the seed is 
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valid, and the NM’s secret key SKeyN. Seeds are 
therefore specific to user server- window 
combinations. As a consequence, a seed is useful 
only for a particular server to link a particular user 
during a particular linkability window W’. 
 
Figure. 3. Evolution of seeds and nymbles. The f 
and g are two distinct cryptographic hash 
functions. 
PERFORMANCE 
To establish a Nymble-connection to a server, a 
registered user must provide a valid ticket, which is 
acquired as part of a credential from the NM. To 
acquire a credential for server sid during the current 
linkability window. A credential contains all the 
nymble tickets for a particular linkability window 
that a user can present to a particular server. A 
ticket contains a nymble specific to a server, time 
period, and linkability window. The ctxt is 
encrypted data that the NM can use during a 
complaint that involves the nymble ticket. In 
particular, ctxt contains the first nymble (nymble0) 
and the user gets the sequence of nymbles using 
seed function. During the complaint, the NM can 
extract the user’s seed and issue it to the server by 
evolving the seed, and nymble0 helps the NM to 
recognize whether the user has already been 
blacklisted or not. A server’s blacklist is a list of 
nymbles corresponding to all the nymbles that the 
server has complained about. Users can quickly 
check their blacklisting status at a server by 
checking to see whether their nymble0 appears in 
the server’s blacklist. 
A server complains to the NM about a misbehaving 
user by submitting the user’s nymble ticket that is 
used in the offending connection. The NM returns a 
seed, from which the server creates a linking token, 
which contains the seed and the corresponding 
nymble. Each server maintains a list of linking 
tokens called the linking-list, and updates each 
token on the list at every time period. When a user 
presents a nymble ticket for making a nymble-
connection, the server checks the nymble within the 
ticket against the nymbles in the linking-list entries. 
A match indicates that the user has been 
blacklisted. Servers update their blacklists for their 
purposes; the server needs to provide the user with 
its blacklist for the current time period during a 
Nymble-connection establishment and the server 
needs to be able to blacklist the misbehaving users 
by processing the newly filed complaints. When 
there is no complaint blacklists remain unchanged. 
When there are complaints, the new entries are 
added to the blacklists. The server updates its 
blacklist upon its first Nymble-connection 
establishment request in a time period t. 
In Figure 4 The X-axis represents the number of 
entries which consists of complaints in the blacklist 
update request, for  tickets in the credential (equal 
to L, the number of time periods in a linkability 
window w’), nymbles in the blacklist, tokens and 
seeds in the blacklist update response, and nymbles 
in the blacklist and the Y-axis represents Size in 
KB. The tickets in the credential (equal to L, the 
number of time periods in a linkability window 
w’), and nymbles in the blacklist. In general, each 
structure grows linearly as the number of entries 
increases. Credentials and blacklist update requests 
grow at the same rate because a credential is a 
collection of tickets which is more or less what is 
sent as a complaint list when the server wishes to 
update its blacklist. 
 
Figure.4. The Performance of Nymble System. 
For example, a linkability window of 1 day with 5 
minute time periods equates to         L = 576.The 
size of a credential in this case is about 120 KB. 
The size of a blacklist update request with 100 
complaints is       25 KB, whereas the size of a 
blacklist update response for 100 complaints is 
only about 8 KB. The size of a blacklist with 1000 
nymbles is 34 KB. 
CONCLUSION 
Here an efficient system of Nymble was presented. 
Users obtain a well-organized collection of 
nymbles to connect to websites without extra 
information and by these collections of nymbles 
anonymous access to services. In our proposed 
scheme any number of anonymizing networks can 
depend on same Nymble system. While our work 
applies towards anonymizing networks, we make a 
consideration of Tor for exposition purpose. In our 
system, the user can download server’s blacklist as 
well as verify their status and when blacklisted, the 
user disconnects straight away. Our system 
presents subjective blacklisting; quick 
authentication speeds, and undetermined 
authentication, backward unlink ability, and handle 
sybil attack to make its usage convenient. 
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